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ECONOMIC SITUATION 
AND ECONOMIC REFORM 
IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Introduction 
in Eastern Europe 
The 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe started a progressive and 
irreversible move towards political pluralism and parliamentary democracy, 
private enterprise and a market economy open to international trade and 
investment. The transition was made harder by the major problems inherited 
from the old system: macroeconomic imbalances ( monetary overhang and 
related shortages, over-full employment, external deficits and debts) and a 
capacity structure inappropriate to domestic and foreign demand, to the state 
of technology and to· environmental protection. Thus systemic change was 
accompanied by macroeconomic stabilisation programmes supported by the 
international community, and by attempts at capacity restructuring. 
Because the various countries and sectors set out from different starting 
positions, and because the complex process of transformation has progressed 
at different speeds, achievements to date have also differed. In general, 
stabilization has been relatively fast and successful, normalising the state of 
markets and hardening domestic currencies often to the point of convertibility. 
Transition has been slower than initially expected, especially as a result of 
technical and political delays in privatization. Restructuring has hardly begun. 
Poland, Hungary and the CSFR, now connected by the Visegrad 
Treaty of February 1991 that led to a free trade area from June 
1992, have made the most significant progress. The Polish 
stabilization programme of January 1990 provided a shock 
therapy prototype for the rest of the area. Hungary was in a better 
macroeconomic position and did not need it, but intensified price 
and trade liberalization along the same lines in 1990-91. The 
CSFR was favoured by an even better macroeconomic position, 
offset by harder tasks of institutional change (no private sector, 
monopolies) and industrial restructuring (away from metallurgy, 
armaments, and an over-sized and excessively diversified machine 
building sector). Their systemic transition has, necessarily, been 
more gradual than their stabilization and liberalization, but has 
achieved the transformation of a monolithic banking system into a 
multi-level system of central and commercial banking, the 
development of financial markets, some privatization of state 
assets and the growth of new private enterprises, the opening of 
their economies and the redirection of foreign trade. 
The achievements of these three countries have been matched by 
closer ties with the European Community, through the so-called 
Europe Agreements which came into force on an interim basis in 
March I 992. The agreements provide for ongoing political 
dialogue through 'Association Councils' and aim at implementing 
a free trade area within ten years ( except for agriculture) in two 
stages, with all trade barriers on these countries' exports to the 
Community to be removed within a year (except for sensitive 
products, which represent less than half of their exports). 
Accession to full membership will naturally depend on further EC 
developments and on potential members' willingness and ability to 
implement the 'acquis communautaire'. 
The progress of the CSFR has been handicapped by the split 
between the Czech and Slovak republics. Nationalism and 
national disintegration have characterized transitional countries, 
but Czech and Slovak separation is set for an amicable solution, to 
the point of preserving a common currency. Nationalist, ethnic 
and religious strife has exploded into a gruesome civil war in 
Yugoslavia, dissipating stabilization efforts and freezing effective 
transition except for Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria, though 
behind the Visegrad three, have made significant progress. In 
Albania, stabilization and reform are a long way behind. 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 the 
individual republics have pursued stabilization and transition at 
differing paces. Probably Russia and the Baltic states have 
advanced more than the others, while armed conflict in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, and chaotic situations in Moldova and 
Tadjikistan, have prevented them from making any headway. For 
all the former Soviet republics disintegration has created 
additional costs of disrupted trade flows and great confusion over 
the role and management of the rouble, which are still unresolved 
and are major obstacles in the way of further progress. 
All the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have suffered serious and protracted recession, as 
witnessed by rapid decline of national income, industrial output, 
investment, living standards, and the rapid appearance of large 
scale unemployment. These phenomena are partly overempha-
sized by the statistical procedures, through former achievements 
grossly overstated by exaggeration and the complete lack of 
market verification, and through underrecording of current 
growth of the private sector, but are still significantly large. Partly 
they are the manifestation of already existing problems (such as 
overmanning, negative value added activities, subsidization, bad 
loans) which have only been able to surface under the new system 
and are not due to it. Partly~ for the net importers of energy ~ 
they are due to the delayed oil shock of importing at world prices. 
Another major factor was the collapse of CMEA, which ended in 
September 1991; this was the unavoidable consequence of Soviet 
intransigence, though in any case trade would have collapsed 
following Soviet decline. 
There is now an increasing awareness that to some extent the 
recession may have been due to specific features, or dosages, of 
stabilization measures and reform policies, such as: the high 
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transitional costs of freeing trade ahead of structural change; 
initial overshooting of monetary and credit squeezes; currency 
under- and over-valuation; delays in privatization and, meanw-
hile, neglect of the still large state sector. 
All the recessionary factors listed above either have once-and-for-
all effects, which should have been absorbed by now, or are factors 
rectifiable by policy changes. Thus one should expect the decline to 
come to an end in 1993, at least for the countries which were early 
starters. In fact the decline has slowed down, and in Poland and 
the CSFR by mid-1992 the first signs have appeared of bottoming 
out. 
The international community has played a leading role in assisting 
transitional economies, with loans obtained through membership 
of the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD, balance of payments 
assistance, funds backing exchange rate stability and convert-
ibility, emergency aid, grants, guarantees, technical assistance. The 
Community PHARE programme, promptly initiated in 1990 for 
Poland and Hungary, has been extended to another eight 
countries. 
Everywhere, however, new problems have also emerged, which 
can be eased by international resources and technical assistance 
but cannot be resolved without determined government action and 
sacrifices by the citizens of the countries concerned. Indeed there is 
a strong case for international assistance being made conditional 
on domestic commitment to tackle these problems. 
First, there is a widespread fiscal crisis, caused by inflation lags and 
by profitability falls, by a reduced size of the state sector and the 
tax privileges of the private sector, by the cost of unemployment 
and by often over-generous social welfare provisions. There is a 
need to modernize the tax system and its administration, and to 
implement budgetary discipline so as to contain deficits within 
reasonable and prefixed limits. This is vital, especially in countries 
with still undeveloped domestic financial markets and with limited 
access to international finance, where therefore deficits above a 
small percentage of national income are necessarily financed by 
monetary expansion and so crowd out investment. 
Second, the transition from a passive to an active monetary policy 
typically has created a boom in inter-enterprise debts, many of 
which are bad loans. These, together with the build-up of 
enterprise arrears towards banks, and added to the stock of bad 
loans inherited from the old system, threaten the financial stability 
of transitional economies. There is a need to clean up the balance 
sheets of financial institutions, to recapitalize enterprises and 
banks, to enforce liquidation and bankruptcy procedures, and to 
proceed with privatization. 
Third, there is a recrudescence of wage-push inflation, resulting 
from pent-up aspirations, impatience, indulgence in populist 
tendencies. A formal or infonnal social pact appears necessary to 
give legitimacy to necessary austerity policies otherwise avoided by 
weak governments and fragmented parliaments for fear of social 
unrest and electoral backlash. 
Last but not least, after decades of high though misdirected capital 
accumulation, there is now underinvestment, with respect to the 
requirements of capacity restructuring and the resumption of 
growth. Barring further cuts in living standards, higher investment 
can only be funded from foreign capital. including operations of 
debt restructuring and relief. Private investment inflows have been 
disappointing, apart from Hungary, though Polish prospects have 
been improving recently. Public international funds can go some 
of the way to fill the gap but ultimately it is up to the transitional 
countries to create the legislation, incentives, domestic economic 
climate, credible and stable policies, capable of inducing higher 
levels of foreign investment and savings. Growth, once resumed, 
should be able to feed and sustain itself. justifying the more 
optimistic predictions of acceleration in the second half of this 
decade; however, this virtuous circle is not yet in motion and will 
not be, by any means, automatic. 
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Albania 
Albania, with its population of 3.3 million, is a predominantly 
agricultural economy, whose level of economic development is the 
lowest in Europe. Until early 1991, Albania was a remarkably pure 
example of a centralized command economy: no private property, 
all economic decisions taken centrally in the five-year plans, a 
virtually flat income distribution, and autarky as an ideal. This 
policy increasingly starved the country of foreign inputs and 
technology. As a result, the physical and human infrastructure 
became grossly inadequate, technology became increasingly 
backward and output growth decelerated gradually over the past 
few decades. Combined with one of the highest population growth 
rates in Europe (over 2% per annum) this meant that output per 
capita in 1990 was I 0% lower than a decade earlier. 
The political events of 1990 and 199 I have had a catastrophic 
effect on the economy. The central planning system has stopped 
working, and nothing has yet been put in its place. Whereas in 
other East European countries systemic inertia kept much of the 
economy going in the early stages of the transition, the collapse in 
Albania was immediate and very deep. GDP is estimated to have 
fallen by 30% in I 991 and by a further 11 % during the first half of 
I 992. Industrial output in I 99 I fell to almost half its 1990 level, 
and has continued to decline during the first part of 1992. The 
upheaval which followed the privatization of agriculture seriously 
disrupted the planting of crops in the autumn of 1991 and led to a 
collapse of the spring l 992 harvest, thus making the country 
almost entirely dependent on food aid. Unemployment has 
reached 70%, the workforce is demoralized, discipline is low and 
absenteeism high. Frequent strikes have exacerbated the dow-
ntum. 
The general government budget developed an increasing deficit in 
recent years (20% of GDP in 1990, 47.5°/., in 1991 and an 
estimated 50'% during the first half of I 992). Tax revenues, which 
are virtually all drawn from the ailing enterprise sector, declined 
from 42% of GDP in 1990 to 28% in 1991 and to 16% in the first 
half of I 992. Furthermore, in an effort to prevent a complete social 
breakdown, the government decided to continue paying redund-
ant workers 80% of their previous wages. The exploding budget 
deficit was met by printing money. The government that was 
formed following legislative elections in March 1992 has replaced 
the 80% scheme with a social assistance system which will provide 
a subsistence income to the unemployed. With the exception of24 
items of basic necessity all prices have been liberalized, yet most 
goods remain scarce. Thus excess liquidity has led to a monetary 
overhang and spiralling inflation, currently estimated at I 0-15% 
per month. 
Economic reforn1 is still in its initial stages. During l 99 I private 
enterprise was legalized and a few other piecemeal measures were 
taken, such as allowing private car ownership. The privatization of 
agricultural land was carried out in a fairly chaotic way but is now 
nearly completed; all collective farms were broken up and the land 
was distributed to private farmers. A two-tier banking system has 
been created, consisting of an independent central bank and three 
competing commercial banks. The liberalization of foreign trade, 
the privatization of those state enterprises deemed to be viable, 
gradual moves towards currency convertibility and the drafting of 
several important pieces of legislation, including a commercial 
code, a company law and a bankruptcy law, have been 
announced. 
The currency has been twice devalued since September 1991, but 
this is of Ii ttle relevance, since trade has collapsed and the external 
position of the country has become extremely grave. The 1990 
current account in convertible currencies recorded a deficit of close 
to US$ 91 million, which was financed by foreign credits and, to a 
lesser extent, by a drawing down of international reserves, which 
are now less than $5m. The situation further deteriorated in 1991, 
with hard currency exports falling to $73m compared to $123m in 
1990 ( - 40.4 % ) and hard currency imports declining to $201 m 
compared to $228m in 1990 (-11.9%). The drop in total trade 
was even more pronounced because of the abandonment of all 
clearing agreements with East European countries during 1991 
and the resulting collapse of non-convertible trade. New credit 
from foreign banks is unlikely to be forthcoming, as Albania is 
confronted with a huge outstanding external debt of over US$ 500 
million. Over 70% of this debt is due in the form of arrears on 
short-term credits with some fifteen European commercial banks. 
A committee of creditor foreign banks has been formed; the 
National Bank of Albania has asked for a debt rescheduling, but 
foreign banks are requiring an agreement with the IMF on an 
economic stabilization and restructuring programme as a 
condition for negotiations. 
ALBANIA 
Area ( 1000 sq km) 
Population (millions) 
Population density (per sq km) 
Main Economic Indicators 
GDP at constant prices(a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Industrial production(a) 
Consumer price index (b) 
Unemployment rate, in % (c) 
Budget balance. % GDP (d) 
Trade balance,$ bn(e) 
Current account,$ bn(e) 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (c) 
Debt-export ratio, % (t) 
27.5 
3.3 
120 
1990 
-13.l 
-7.4 
-7.5 
8.6 
-20.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.35 
284 
1991 
-30.0 
50.0 
-47.5 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.55 
753 
1992 latest 
- 11.0 Jan-June 
70.0 June 
- 50.0 Jan-June 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) Reliable data not available. 
(c) End of period. 
(d) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
(c) In convertible currencies. 
(f) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
The new government reached provisional agreement with the IMF 
in July 1992 on an economic and financial programme, which 
could be supported by a 12-month stand-by arrangement from the 
Fund. The main elements of the programme are: the abolition of 
most remaining price controls; a wage policy designed to ensure a 
decline in real wages; a sharp reduction in the budget deficit, to be 
achieved mainly by lowering expenditure; substantial monetary 
tightening; and liberalization of the foreign exchange regime. 
Baltic States 
The three Baltic republics (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) were 
forced to accede to the USSR in 1940, so beginning a 50-year 
period of Soviet domination. They formally regained full 
independence in August 1991. This was the culmination of moves 
towards independence that had begun in the late 1980s as the 
political climate in the then USSR became more tolerant. 
All three Baltic states were granted limited economic autonomy by 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with effect from 1 January 1990. 
Although this included the right to set up their own central and 
commercial banking system and established a two-tier fiscal 
system of state and local budgets, the individual republics' budgets 
remained tied to the central Union system. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union remained an economic and monetary union, with 
monetary, exchange rate and trade policy controlled from the 
centre. Responsibility for the central planning and supply system 
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was devolved to the republics for the agricultural sector and most 
of the industrial sector, but the defence, chemical, energy and 
transport sectors continued to be planned from the centre. 
Moreover, the highly specialized and monopolistic Soviet 
production structure continued to be a check on independent 
economic policy. 
The Baltic republics are among the smallest of the former Soviet 
Union in terms ofland area, population and the economy. In 1990 
Estonia totalled 0.6% of the total USSR population, while Latvia 
accounted for 0.9% and Lithuania for 1.3%. Lithuania has the 
largest economy of the three, which accounted for 1.4% of USSR 
Net Material Product in 1988, while the figure for Latvia was 
1.1 % and for Estonia 0.6%. Nevertheless, these economies are 
relatively more prosperous than other former Soviet republics. 
Estimates of net output per capita for 1988 show Latvia 19%, 
Estonia 17% and Lithuania 10% above the average for the USSR 
as a whole. Moreover, the Baltic republics appear to have avoided 
the gradual downturn in economic activity that began elsewhere in 
the USSR in the mid- l 980s, although sharp declines were recorded 
in 1990 and 1991. 
The three economies were highly integrated within the Soviet 
economic structure, previously deriving over 80% of their imports 
from inter-republic trade. Trade with western partners and former 
CMEA members is small. The decline in the Russian economy, in 
particular, has denied the Baltic states much of their main export 
market. Moreover, the Baltic republics' relative prosperity within 
the Soviet Union reflected a sizeable inter-republic trade deficit, 
which was financed by intra-union transfers. Under independence 
this deficit, if sustained, would translate into a substantial external 
trade deficit which could not be financed. The move to world 
prices and hard currency trading has had a negative effect on the 
Baltic states' terms of trade. The main reasons for this are that 
previously they were supplied with Russian oil and energy 
products at below world prices, and in return exported relatively 
low-value manufactured products. This worsening of the terms of 
trade only serves to compound the external payments problem. 
Nevertheless, the withholding of supplies by other republics, 
particularly Russia, during 1991 resulted in a decline in imports 
and hence in trade being close to balance in all three countries. 
The three republics are progressing at varying paces towards 
establishing a market economy and reorienting trade towards the 
West. Stabilization policy is now beginning, and all three Baltic 
republics became members of the IMF in April/May. The 
countries are in the process of discussing their economic 
stabilization programmes with the IMF. Monetary policies have 
been exceptionally tight because of the failure of Russia to deliver 
roubles. Each of the three countries has now left or is in the process 
of leaving the rouble zone. It is expected that by the time the 
stabilization programmes are in place, all three countries will have 
their own currency, and therefore be responsible for their own 
monetary policy. 
The budget was broadly balanced in both Estonia and Lithuania 
in the first half of 1992, but in Latvia a deficit amounting to 3 .5% 
of GDP emerged. Revenues are likely to be depressed in the 
second half of the year, largely as a result of shortfalls in tax 
payments by enterprises facing a build up of domestic and inter-
state payments arrears. 
Estonia 
During 1991 Estonia's GDP is estimated to have fallen by 11 % in 
real terms following a 4% decline in 1990. The deterioration in 
trading conditions was the root cause. This trend continued into 
the first half of 1992 as industrial output fell by 38% compared to 
the same period in 1991. 
-
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Unemployment has yet to reach significant levels in Estonia, 
despite the reduction in economic activity throughout 1990 and 
1991. Enterprises have been reluctant to shed labour, and 
unemployment in July 1992 stood at only 5,635, although this 
represented a big increase over the June figure. The continued 
contraction in output expected during 1992 is likely to result in 
more widespread job losses. 
The adverse trading climate in 1991 reduced import volumes by 
more than export volumes, and export prices rose faster than those 
of imports because price liberalization proceeded more rapidly 
than in other Soviet republics. However, these terms of trade gains 
are expected to be wiped out in 1992, as Russia raises its export 
prices, in particular for fuels. The emergence of a significant trade 
deficit has only been prevented by the lack of finance; the current 
account was roughly in balance in the first half of 1992. 
In response to the decline in output and the corresponding fall in 
tax revenues in 1990 and 1991, the government reduced 
expenditure and achieved budget surpluses in both these years. 
For 1992 a budget was initially set only for the first half of the year, 
in anticipation of the introduction of the new currency (the kroon), 
which took place on 20 June. The government achieved a balanced 
budget for the first half of 1992, and a balanced budget is also 
planned for the full year. However, the growth in inter-enterprise 
arrears has led firms to delay tax payments, which has recently 
started to affect the budget. 
ESTONIA 
Area (!OOO sq km) 45.1 
Population (millions) 1.6 
Population density (per sq km) 35 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices (a) -3.6 -I0.8 -30.0 
Agricultural production (a) -3.2 
Industrial production (a) -5.6 -38.0 
Consumer price index (a) 17.2 260.0 I 156.0 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 0.7 
Budget balance,% GDP(c) 3.1 0.0 
Trade balance,$ bn(d) -O.I -0.l 0.0 
Current account, $ bn (d) 00 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 0.4 
Debt-export ratio. 'X, (e) 685J 
(a) Percentage .increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of pcrrnd. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Q-2 
July 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
Price liberalization has progressed well in Estonia. Goods whose 
prices continue to be controlled include sugar, bread, electricity, 
fuel and rents, while milk, cereals and energy continue to be 
subsidized. The higher general price level that resulted in Estonia 
in 1991 was seen by the government as a means of encouraging 
imports from, and discouraging exports to, other republics. In the 
second quarter of 1992 the cost-of-living index was over 1000% 
higher than in the second quarter of 1991, and 58% higher than in 
the first quarter of 1992. Although the second quarter figure is 
high, it represents a slowing in the rate of price inflation. 
A two-tier banking system has been established. The central bank 
(Bank of Estonia) was founded in 1990, and took on full central 
banking responsibilities at the beginning of 1992, when it absorbed 
the Estonian branch of Gosbank. The private commercial banking 
sector comprised 20 banks at the end of 1991. 
Macroeconomic stabilization is beginning to receive serious 
attention, now that Estonia has left the rouble zone and has its 
own currency. The Bank of Estonia now has genuine respons-
ibility for monetary policy. The kroon is pegged to the OM and is 
internally convertible. The currency is backed by about $ l 20m-
worth of reserves of hard currency, gold and forestry assets held by 
the central bank. A currency board system has been established 
which strictly limits the issue of money to the amount of reserves 
held . The adoption of the currency board system will set a limit to 
monetary expansion. The Estonian authorities are negotiating for 
additional reserve support from the IMF, which would allow the 
Estonian authorities greater freedom of manoeuvre in the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
Budgetary reform began in 1990 by separating central and local 
government budgets, requiring both to be balanced. Progress was 
made in 1991 towards the creation of a tax system consistent with 
that of a market economy. 
Privatization has shown less progress. Up to the end of 1991 little 
over 100 enterprises had passed into private ownership. The 
privatization of municipal housing has proceeded by the 
distribution of vouchers Lo residents. The main impediments to 
further progress appear to be the issue of citizenship and rights to 
ownership, and the additional complications introduced by the 
restitution law. 
Latvia 
GDP fell by 7.6% in real terms in 1991 , the main areas of 
contraction being construction of dwellings, services and freight 
transport. Industrial output remained unchanged, while agricul-
tural output fell by about 4%, mainly because of poor crop yields 
and fodder shortages for callle production. Enforced import 
contraction from former Soviet trading partners, particularly the 
Russian republic, resulted in an unprecedented surplus in trade 
with these partners in 1991. This compares with regular deficits in 
internal trade balances throughout the previous decade. 
During 1990 new institutions were established, including a new tax 
system, which from 1991 enabled an independent fiscal policy to 
be pursued. Provisional estimates of the Latvian budget show a 
substantial surplus in 1991 (about 8% of GDP). This compares to 
a planned deficit of about 0.5% of GDP. The large unanticipated 
surplus was mainly the result of price liberalization, which had a 
positive effect on tax revenues through receipts from the turnover 
tax and enterprise profits. ln addition, adjustments were made 
throughout the year Lo cover previously unforeseen expenditures. 
LATVIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 64.5 
Population (millions) 2.7 
Population density (per sq km) 42 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 
GDP at constant prices (a) - 0.2 - 7.9 
Agricultural production (a) - 17.2 - 3.6 
Industrial production (a) 7.4 0.0 
Consumer price index (a) 10.5 172.2 
Unemployment rate, in o;., (b) 
Budget balance,% GDP(c) 2.1 8.0 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) - 0.2 - 0.2 
Current account, $ bn (d) 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 0.8 
Debt-exeort ratio , % (e) 520.4 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same pcnod of) the previous year 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated stale budget defi cit . accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
1992 
- 30.9 
700.0 
1.6 
- 3.5 
0.0 
0.0 
(e} Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of 1990 hard-currency ex ports. 
latest 
Jan-June 
June 
June 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
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The 1992 budget plans initially covered only the first half of the 
year, and a balanced budget had been envisaged. However, the 
difficulties faced by the enterprise sector resulted in the 
accumulation of tax arrears, and an actual budget deficit of a bout 
3.5% emerged. The government has been forced to finance the 
deficit by borrowing from the central bank. The budget package 
for the second half of the year ain1s to reduce the deficit as a 
proportion of GDP. This will be difficult, in view of the fact that 
unemployment, which stood at 23,000 in June, is expected to 
increase as the year progresses. Measures to reinforce the tax 
collection system have been initiated, and a decision to introduce a 
tax-based incomes policy has been taken. 
Following the declaration of independence in rn.id-1990 the reform 
programme proceeded with the establishing of the Bank of Latvia, 
which subsequently took over the functions of the Latvian branch 
of Gosbank, as well as the state commercial banks. The private 
banking sector has expanded; 17 banks had been created by the 
end of March 1992. 
The central bank will issue and manage the new currency (the !at), 
which it envisages pegging at parity with the ECU. It is planned to 
make the !at immediately convertible for current account 
purposes. However, the immediate problem of securing sufficient 
roubles from Gosbank in Moscow led the authorities to introduce 
a temporary parallel currency in May - the Latvian rouble. 
Furthermore, on 20 July, the Latvian authorities left the rouble 
zone by replacing all remaining Russian roubles with Latvian 
roubles. Since then the Latvian rouble has been the only legal 
tender and will remain so until the introduction of the !at, possibly 
as early as September. A clearing arrangement for trade bas been 
established with Russia. 
Price liberalization has proceeded at a steady pace in Latvia since 
January 199 l. These initial measures freed prices mostly for non-
food items, while other goods were subject to price ceilings or 
maximum profit margins. At the end of 1991 farm procurement 
and all retail food prices were liberalized. Industrial goods prices 
were further liberalized in January 1992. More recently, farm 
support prices for all products except grains have been abolished, 
and maximum profit margins for food processors and retail 
traders have been removed. Retail prices have risen strongly, but 
have moderated in recent months. In June 1992 the index of retail 
prices was 700% higher than in the same month in 1991. 
Privatization so far has progressed only slowly in Latvia. This is 
partly due to the provisions for restitution , which set the end of 
1993 as the deadline for the submission of claims. So far the 
programme has mainly been confined to agricultural co-
operatives, small shops and service establishments. No firm plans 
exist yet for privatization of large-scale enterprises. 
Lithuania 
NMP is estimated to have declined by about 13% in 1991 , 
following a decline of about 5% in 1990. This came about mainly 
because of the deterioration in the trade situation. Trade with 
Russia continues to be hampered by obstructive banking and 
clearing arrangements in Moscow and by Russian enterprises 
reneging on supply agreements. The Lithuanian authorities 
estimate that Russian enterprises owe some 8bn roubles to 
Lithuanian counterparts. 
Industrial output in the second quarter of 1992 was 41 % down on 
the same period in 1991, while agricultural output declined by 
18% over the same period. Further declines are anticipated as the 
year progresses, particularly in the agricultural sector, which has 
-
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been severely affected by the drought in the region. Unemploy-
ment stood at 20,308 in May 1992. 
Price liberalization progressed in I 991, although controls remain 
for food, oil and rents and monopoly products (communications, 
transport, energy and pharmaceuticals). About 70% of GDP is 
estimated to be under a liberal price regime; the remaining 30% is 
regulated by the state, directly or indirectly. 
LITHUANIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 65.2 
Population (millions) 3.7 
Population density (per sq km) 57 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
NMP at constant prices(a) -5.0 -12.8 -35.0 
Agricultural production (a) -11.5 -8.0 -18.0 
Industrial production (a) 0.3 -1.3 -41 
Consumer price index (a) 8.4 224.7 I 000.0 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 1.1 
Budget halancc, 'Yo GDP(c) -2.9 3.0 0.0 
Trade balance, $ hn ( d) -2.0 -0.1 small+ 
Current account,$ bn (e) 
Gross foreign debt, $ hn (b) 1.0 
Debt-export ratio, 'X, (11 442.7 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
(c) Invisibles halance not available. 
(f) Gross hard-currency debt a:-. a percentage of hard-currency export:-.. 
latest 
Jan-June 
Q-2 
Q-2 
June 
May 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
Estimates suggest that price inflation rose as high as 275% in 199 I. 
The trend had slowed until November, when the latest 
liberalization law came into effect. Prices continued to rise at an 
increasing pace in early 1992, mainly fuelled by real wage growth. 
Inflation in the first half of 1992 exceeded I 000% at an annual 
rate. 
Provisional data show a significant decline in imports from other 
Soviet republics in 1991, resulting in a trade surplus with these 
republics. A small overall trade surplus was recorded in the first 
half of 1992. 
The I 991 budget was broadly balanced, and this continued into 
the first half of 1992. However, a substantial budget deficit is 
anticipated for the full year in 1992. The deficit is expected both 
because of increased expenditures, related largely to subsidies to 
compensate for price increases, and because of depressed revenues 
resulting from the weakened financial situation of state enter-
prises. This last factor has been exacerbated by the build-up of 
inter-enterprise arrears, a problem which the central bank has 
sought to alleviate by injecting credits into the banking system. 
Monetary reform is to be based on the new currency (the litas), 
and the central bank will be responsible for monetary policy. The 
insufficient supply of roubles from Russia has led the government 
to introduce coupons, issued as a proportion of social benefits 
(pensions, student grants and other benefits). The Lithuanian 
authorities estimated that these vouchers accounted for about 
60% to 70°/r, of money transactions in June. 
Stabilization policy has yet to get under way. The government is 
currently negotiating a programme with the IMF. The introduc-
tion of the new currency will allow more scope for the control of 
inflation, which will also depend to some extent on the exchange 
rate policy adopted. Indications from the central bank are that the 
litas will be allowed to tloat, possibly with a flexible link to the 
ECU, and that the degree of convertibility will be limited. 
Stabilization will also entail steps to reduce the size of the projected 
budget deficit in 1992. 
-
Privatization in Lithuania is based on a voucher system. The 
privatization of residential property began in 1991, with 50% to 
60% of apartments transferred to private ownership. In the 
enterprise sector sales have proceeded by auction for small-scale 
enterprises and a public share subscription system for larger firms. 
Some 48,000 farms are also said to have been privatized. The 
introduction of a stock market is planned for later this year. 
Little progress has been made in refonning the banking system. 
Twenty branches have been separated from the central bank, but it 
retains ten commercial branches, through which it continues to 
engage in commercial activities. Further progress is being 
hampered by uneasy relations between the central bank and the 
government. 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria started its far-reaching economic reforn1 in February 
1991 under exceptionally unfavourable conditions. The legacy of 
central planning included an excessively developed heavy 
industrial sector, based in part on artificially cheap energy and lax 
regulation of pollution, and systematic neglect of the traditionally 
competitive agricultural sector. From l 990, the country also 
encountered a number of serious external shocks: first, the 
collapse of trade with the CMEA, and in particular the USSR, on 
which Bulgaria was particularly dependent; second, the need to 
import energy at world prices to replace cheap Soviet supplies; 
third, the lack of access to commercial credit as a result of the 
unilateral moratorium on external debt declared in March 1990; 
and fourth, the effect of international embargoes on Iraq and, 
recently, Serbia. 
The February 1991 reform package contained a series of 
liberalization, stabilization and structural reform measures. Most 
prices were freed at one stroke, in order to eliminate the 
increasingly pervasive shortages and the very substantial overhang 
of unwanted savings. The foreign trade regime was significantly 
liberalized. A new exchange rate system was put in place, 
providing for a single floating exchange rate. Fiscal policy was 
aimed at simultaneously reducing the share of public spending in 
GDP, and cutting the deficit. Subsidies were slashed from 14.9% 
of GDP in 1990 to4.0% in 1991. The budget was, however, caught 
in a 'debt trap': the full cost of interest due on internal and external 
debt amounted to I 7.5% of GDP in 199 l. Only by not servicing 
external debts could the cash deficit be limited to 3.6% of GDP: 
on an accrual basis it was 14.9%. Monetary policy was extremely 
restrictive, with both credit ceilings and positive real interest rates. 
This was supplemented by a very tight tax-based incomes policy. 
Structural change has been slower than planned. Budget 
constraints on enterprises remain too soft, partly because no 
bankruptcy law exists yet. In the financial sphere, progress has 
been made with the restructuring of the banking system and the 
enactment of modern banking legislation. A large proportion of 
bank assets consist of bad loans to enterprises, however; the 
government has started a process of gradual recapitalization, but 
this is hampered by its budgetary cost. Privatization has long been 
stalled because of political difficulties. 
Only in 1992 was structural reform speeded up, mainly by the 
adoption of several major pieces of legislation. In January 1992, a 
liberal foreign investment law was passed. For large industrial 
enterprises, a privatization law was adopted in April. The 
restitution of small shops and businesses is well under way. The 
law on privatization of agricultural land was finally revised in 
April 1992; effective implementation is expected to start by late 
summer. 
-7-
The economic results since the start of refonn have been 
substantially worse than initially expected. After declining by 
11.8% in 1990, real GDP fell by another 22.9% in 1991. Output 
trends in early 1992 arc still sharply negative, even if the pace of 
decline appears to be slackening. The retail price level jumped by 
277% during the first quarter of 1991, and has since then 
continued to increase at a 4-6% monthly rate. The collapse of 
Bulgaria's traditional foreign markets and the decline in domestic 
output led to a sharp decrease in exports. This, plus the acute 
shortfalls in external financing, forced a very rigorous contraction 
of imports in 1991 (by 62'Yti in hard currencies)~ which in turn 
exacerbated the domestic contraction. 
BULGARIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 1)2.5 
Population (millions) 9.0 
Population density (per sq km) 80 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices (a) -11.8 -22.9 
Agricultural production (a) -6.7 -13.2 
Industrial production (a) -16.3 -27.5 -17.5 
Consumer price index (a) 21.6 m.s 
Unemployment rate, in "A, (b) 1.7 10.2 
Budget balance, 01., GDP (c) -9.l -14.9 
Trade balan<-'e, $ bn (d) 0.8 0.0 
Current account, $ bn (d) 1.2 0.9 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 10.0 l l .4 
Debt-export ratio, % (e) 299 271 
(a) Percentage increase over (the :-.ame period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit accrual basis. 
(d) Jn convertible currencies. 
112.8 
12.5 
0.2 
--0. l 
12.0 
(e) Gros::-. hard-currency debt as a percenta~c of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Q-1 
Jan-June 
May 
Q-l 
Q-1 
April 
The cost of adjustment has largely been borne by wages and the 
labour market. Real wages fell by 42% during 1991. Public sector 
labour-shedding has been very substantial at around 900,000 jobs 
(over 20% of the labour force), both in the state administration 
and in the state enterprise sector. Unemployment rose from 
negligible levels at the start of 1991 to 12.5% in May 1992. 
In April 1991 Bulgaria obtained an arrangement with the Paris 
Club which recommended deferral and rescheduling of all debt 
servicing payments to official creditors, including arrears on short-
term credits. However, the greater part of the debt~ about 80% 
of the total $12 billion - is owed to commercial banks. Although 
the initial reaction of the banks was not positive, the talks are 
continuing. 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Russia 
The radical economic reform programme launched in January 
1992 has suffered severe setbacks in recent months. Macroecon-
omic stabilization in particular proved to be politically unfeasiblc, 
in part because no real control is being exercised over money and 
credit creation in the rouble zone (cf. section on ClS below). 
Discussions with the IMF on a stand-by arrangement, a necessary 
condition for the release of $24 billion in Western aid, have run 
into delays as a result. Russia is now clearly on the brink of 
hyperinflation, and output continues to decline sharply. 
A radical reform pro):,>Tamme was launched on 2 January 1992. 
Most prices were freed immediately. Fiscal policy aimed to be very 
restrictive, with drastic spending cuts and an overhaul of the tax 
system. A 28°/ci VAT was introduced as one of the main sources of 
revenue. After some confusion about the Central Bank's support 
for the government's policy, monetary policy turned very tight. 
This policy package was not sufficiently comprehensive to ensure 
stabilization, however. The main weaknesses were exchange rate 
policy and wage policy. The exchange rate regime remained 
excessively fragmented and distorting, with a multitude of rates 
ranging from 5.4 roubles/$ to a grossly undervalued auction rate 
of 230 roubles/$; the latter oscillated around 140 from March 
onwards as a result of the Central Bank's interventions in the very 
thin foreign exchange market. These interventions were stopped in 
July, and the rate depreciated to over 160 by the end of the month. 
Enterprise wages have not been controlled, as would have been 
desirable in view of the underdeveloped state of the credit and 
banking system. 
As a result, prices shot up by 250% in January; thereafter the rate 
slowed down but remained very high at between 15 and 25% per 
month. A serious shortage of bank notes emerged, which held 
down consumer price inflation somewhat, but further strength-
ened the trend towards barter, and fostered popular discontent as 
employers were frequently unable to pay wages on time. The 
consequences of the Central Bank's high interest-rate policy arc 
being circumvented in part by the explosive growth of inter-
enterprise credits, which fuels wholesale price inflation. The new 
VAT is proving difficult to collect, leading to sizeable state revenue 
shortfalls. The government has reported only a small budget 
deficit for the first quarter, but there has been substantial slippage 
since then. Economic decline continues unabated: compared to 
the same period of 1991, industrial output fell by 13.5% during the 
first half of the year, and investment by 46%. A very large share of 
the population was pushed below the poverty line. 
RUSSIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 17 075.4 
Population (millions) 147.4 
Population density (per sq km) 9 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices (a) 0.4 -9.0 -14 
Agricultural production (a) -3.6 -4.7 
Industrial production (a) -0.1 -8.0 -13.5 
Consumer price index (a) 5.0 90.4 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 0.1 
Budget balance, 'Yo GDP(c) -20 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) 2.4 7.3 
Current account,$ bn(d) -1.l 3.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b, e) 38.0 40.1 
Debt-export ratio, % (e, f) 148 162 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
875 
0.2 
0.5 
43.4 
(c) Notional balance for 1991 includes assumed share of Union budget. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
Q-1 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
March 
Jan-June 
May 
(e) Russia's share in debt contracted by the former USSR is 61.34%. In practice it might 
assume a higher burden. For the debt/export ratio calculation a share of 80% has been 
assumed. 
(f) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
The trade surplus, which in 1991 was still substantial ($7.4 billion), 
all but disappeared during the January-June period ($0.5 billion), 
as officially recorded exports declined more steeply ( - 35%) than 
imports ( - 24% ). Trade with fonner CMEA partners fell even 
more, and was nearly halved compared to January-June 1991. 
Since the end of 1991, Russia has been unable to service its foreign 
debt; in the following months it reached temporary agreements 
with public and private creditors for a deferral of principal 
repayments. However, substantial arrears have been incurred since 
then (reported by official Russian sources at $8.5 billion by July, of 
which more than $1 billion were interest arrears), indicating that a 
longer-term solution to the debt problem is urgently needed. 
From late February onwards, the government worked in 
consultation with the IMF, to which it formally acceded in June, 
on a much more comprehensive strategy for the rest of the year. A 
preliminary version of this plan was submitted to, and endorsed 
by, the !MF Board and formed the basis of the GTs conditional 
aid pledge of $24 billion made at the beginning of April and 
reiterated during the July summit in Munich. The main elements 
of this second package were reinforced fiscal and monetary 
tightness, a staged increase in domestic energy prices, unification 
of the exchange rate system and an early move to current-account 
convertibility, and more control over wages. 
Discussions with the !MF on this package could not yet be 
concluded, however, as the government ran into serious 
opposition from Parliament and from the powerful lobby of large 
state enterprises. Progress was made in some areas. Energy prices 
were raised somewhat (although they remain far below world 
market levels); a simplification of the exchange rate system was 
implemented in July; an import tax of 5'Yo was introduced (to be 
raised to 15% in September) for budgetary reasons. However, in 
other respects planned measures were deferred and initial targets 
were relaxed. State enterprises got substantial additional access to 
credit. Pensions and minimum wages were increased sharply, wage 
arrears were 80'Yc, indexed, and no progress was made in getting 
wage developments under control. Earlier attempts to master 
inflation by curtailing the number of bank notes in circulation 
were stopped. and large amounts of new high-denomination bills 
are to be released. Although the government in principle 
committed itself to limiting the budget deficit for the second half of 
the year to 5% of GDP, it is unclear how this is to be achieved. 
These developments prompted the IMF to review its strategy for 
supporting Russia and to conceive a staged approach comprising: 
(i) a transitional 'first credit tranche arrangement', (ii) a traditional 
stand-by arrangement conditional upon stricter monitoring and 
(iii) a further arrangement. including activation of the rouble 
stabilization fund. The implementation of this strategy started in 
early August. when the IMF approved the first arrangement 
providing for the use of$ I billion. to be purchased at one stroke. 
There arc manifest divisions within the government -- to which 
President Yeltsin has appointed more representatives from the 
state enterprise sector -- over the course and pace of reform. 
Central bank chairman Matiukhin was replaced by fonner USSR 
Gosbank governor Gerashenko. with the support of industrial 
leaders. By July, those arguing against rapid and comprehensive 
macro-stabilization, even at the risk of losing access to western 
support. were clearly in the ascendancy. 
Ukraine 
In Ukraine. a country of roughly the same area and population as 
France. the collapse of the Soviet empire has implied the 
abandonment not so much of central planning but of centralized 
decision-making from Moscow. The thrust of economic policy 
design has been determined mainly by nationalist forces intent on 
asserting independence from Moscow. At present, the nationalists 
and the old communist nomenklatura seem to have joined forces 
to ensure that change docs not go beyond independence. The goal 
of a separate Ukrainian currency and reservations about an 
important role for the CIS should also be seen in this context. 
Since Ukraine declared its sovereignty in August 199 I, some 
remarkable results in economic policy have been achieved. Price 
liberalization (although forced by developments in Russia) 
narrowed the gap between demand and supply for consumer 
goods. The introduction of Ukrainian coupons as a complement, 
and later as a substitute, for roubles helped to overcome a shortage 
of banknotes in a time of exploding demand for transaction cash, 
although initially severe managerial shortcomings threatened to 
discredit the Government's ability to run macroeconomic policy. 
Finally, the economic reform programme of March 1992 is a 
positive factor. despite the fact that it has so far had little impact 
on Ukrainian economic policy design. It has. however, been 
transmitted to the !MF and could serve as a basis for the 
international community to urge that a comprehensive reform 
strategy be pursued. 
Like the economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian 
economy is subject to major disruptions and a major slump in 
output following the collapse of old structures. The Ukrainian 
economy has already been hit by two severe shocks: (i) the 
consequences of disintegration and the struggle for independence 
from the old Soviet system. with the associated deterioration in the 
terms of trade and (ii) the consequences of a sudden and 
unprepared liberalization of regulated and centrally fixed prices in 
an economy where restructuring of inappropriate capacity is a 
particularly daunting task. Two more shocks may be coming: (i) 
the introduction of a separate. convertible currency in the absence 
of appropriate currency reserves at a time of large-scale 
macroeconomic imbalances and a lack of capability and 
willingness to steer a sound and sustainable fiscal and monetary 
policy and (ii) the transition from a command economy to a 
market economy. 
Price liberalization in Russia, which led to a steep price rise for 
goods of Russian origin, took the Ukrainian authorities by 
surprise. To avoid its adverse impact on Ukrainian enterprises' 
balance sheets (as a result of higher input prices) and to avoid an 
explosion of cross-border shopping by Russian consumers (as a 
result of inter-republic price differentials). the Ukrainian 
Government had to follow Russian price deregulation for 
tradablcs. The first steps to lift price controls were taken in 
January 1992; further steps followed in February and April. Price 
liberalization was introduced without preparation and on an ad-
hoe basis. and a price-wage-price spiral was initiated, which has 
already had strong negative repercussions on economic activity. 
Prices have increased by a factor of 16 (industrial wholesale prices) 
and 8 (consumer retail prices) over the last year. This has not led to 
an immediate collapse of real consumption, as wages and transfer 
income were partially indexed. 
UKRAINE 
Area (1000 sq km) 603.7 
Population (millions) 51.7 
Population density (per sq km) 86 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 
NMP at constant prices (a) -3 -JO 
Agricultural production (a) -7 -4 
Industrial production (a) --1 - 13 
Consumer price index (a) 4 H4 
Unemployment rate. in '% (b) 0 0 
Budget balance. 0,,, GDP(c) -I -14 
Trade balance. 'Y., GDP(d) -I 2 
Current account. % GOP (e) 
Gross foreign debt. $ bn (e) 
Deht-cxport ratio. (!~1 ( c) 
(a) Percentage incrca-;c over (tlie ~amc period n!) the prcviou~ year. 
(b) End or period. 
(c) Consolidakd "tak budl!d deficit, accru,it b,isi"· 
(d) Excluding intcr~rt·publ!C tra1.k, in wor!J m,nkct prices. 
(e) Reliable data rwt a\~iilablc. 
1')92 
-18 
-20 
- 15 
775 
0 
-2 
latest 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Q-1 
The sharp decline in output which has occurred since mid-1991 has 
not yet affected the labour market, as enterprises have allowed 
productivity to fall. Indeed, while registered unemployment has 
remained close to zero, ovcrernployment, which was estimated to 
be about 15 to 20 per cent in the mid- l 980s. may have reached 30 
per cent at prevailing levels of output. 
The impact of economic disintegration and price liberalization on 
fiscal and monetary policy has been enormous. In fiscal policy, the 
government was obliged to set up a new structure of taxation and 
of revenue collection, while on the expenditure side provisions had 
to be made for emerging hyperinflation. Furthermore, fiscal policy 
is still dominated by the struggle between the legislative and 
executive power and the struggle to shield consumers and workers 
from feeling directly the costs (and benefits) of economic reforms. 
This has led to several postponements of the adoption of a budget 
law for 1992. Until early July, the President was implementing a 
provisional budget, in which expenditures were partially indexed 
to inflation while revenues fell short of what was needed to cover 
expenditure growth. When a budget law was finally adopted in 
early July, its figures had already been overtaken by events: for 
example, the deficit foreseen for the whole of 1992 was already 
reached by the end of May. The true fiscal position is probably 
worse still, since financial burdens may be concealed by off-budget 
operations, for example, allowing (state) enterprises to borrow on 
a large scale. 
Monetary policy still suffers from the failure to reform the banking 
and financial sector and from the lack of a definite and workable 
assignment of monetary competences. At present, it is the Central 
Bank in Moscow and the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy which 
issue legal tender in Ukraine (roubles and coupons respectively). 
Also the Ukrainian Central Bank's role and instruments for 
controlling the banking sector's activities have not been finalized. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian Central Bank's philosophy still sticks to 
old-fashioned centrally planned money-growth management by 
having both tight and loose monetary policy at the same time. 
While the Central Bank tries to limit consumer-price inflation by 
artificially limiting the issue of new banknotes, it allows large-scale 
borrowing by the (state) enterprise sector. This approach can be 
implemented by maintaining an artificial split of monetary 
circulation ( cash and non-cash transactions). However, such a 
policy is not sustainable in the medium term and is detrimental to 
an efficient banking and financial sector and to the plans for 
introducing a separate currency. 
CIS 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), initially 
heralded as the Soviet Union's successor, so far is only a 
declaration of intent to maintain economic, political, and military 
co-operation among eleven of the remaining twelve ex-Soviet 
republics. No institutional framework has yet been defined, and it 
is doubtful that this will happen soon. Very little co-operation has 
in fact emerged. One of the few areas in which an agreement was 
reached was on how to share out ex-USSR foreign debts and 
assets. but this has to a large extent remained a dead letter, since all 
republics have defaulted on their debt servicing obligations. The 
two main economic issues confronting the CIS states now are 
trade and money. 
Inter-republic trade is likely to be progressively adjusted to 
international prices, even if the rouble remains the main currency 
for the settlement of transactions or if barter deals arc renewed. 
Russia wishes to reduce its trade surplus with the other republics 
through a series of inter-state bilateral agreements setting quotas 
and a compensation system through state orders. Such an 
initiative is completely at odds with efforts to create a market 
system. Other republics arc also negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements and arc designing their own schemes for export 
incentives and management of foreign exchange. The most likely 
result is a further sharp contraction in intra-CIS trade, with serious 
knock-on effects on domestic activity. 
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Yet most former Soviet republics are still part of the rouble zone. 
This implies, in particular, that developments in Russia have 
major consequences for the other states. Indeed, all of them were 
forced to follow Russia's lead in price liberalization at the start of 
1992, whether they were prepared for this or not. At the same time, 
Russia alone cannot bring down inflation as long as the other 
states do not follow adequate monetary and fiscal policies. In the 
absence of co-operation, some states might be forced into issuing 
their own currencies before they are ready for this. Already now, 
several of them have issued multiple-use coupons as rouble 
substitutes to offset the shortage of bank notes. This poses serious 
problems for the payments system and for monetary manage-
ment; it can also lead to these states dumping roubles in other 
republics and to retaliatory export controls. 
During a meeting of ex-USSR central bankers in Tashkent in mid-
May, agreement was reached on guidelines for the rouble zone, 
including credit ceilings, rules on how to issue currency, reserve 
requirements and refinancing rates. The Russian authorities have 
refused to ratify the agreement, however. They maintain that any 
state wishing to remain within the rouble zone should accept that 
Russia alone sets monetary policy. As long as this issue is not 
resolved, macroeconomic control cannot be regained in any 
rouble-zone state, nor can any I MF-supported stabilization 
programmes be effectively implemented. 
Croatia 
Croatia was Yugoslavia's second largest republic with a 
population of 4.7 million. It was second only to Slovenia in terms 
of economic development, its GDP was 25.4% ofYugoslavias and 
GDP per capita was 28% above the Yugoslav average. Industry 
accounts for 41 % of GDP, agriculture for 12% and tourism for 
5°/c,. Croatia has sizeable oil and natural gas reserves in eastern 
Slavonia, a region now mostly under Serbian control. 
Croatia was Yugoslavia's second most industrialized republic: 
industrial production was 21.9% of Yugoslavia's in 1988, and 
approximately 30% of the active population was employed in 
industry and mining. The bulk of the republic's industry is socially 
owned. Enterprises tend to be overmanned, technologically 
backward and uncompetitive by West European standards. Many 
were on the verge of bankruptcy but have been bailed out by the 
state through the repayment of non-performing company debts to 
the banks in the fonn of government bonds. This operation 
accounted for the lion's share of Croatia's $0.7bn public debt. 
Croatia's output has been declining for the past few years ( - 0.9%, 
in 1988, -1.4% in 1989 and -10.2% in 1990). The government 
announced a 23.4% decline in GDP for J 99 J caused by the 
uncertain supply of raw materials, blockades and extensive war 
damage. Output in the first quarter of 1992 was 25% lower than in 
the same period of 1991. Industrial production fell by about 39% 
in 1991 following a IO% decline in 1990. During the first half of 
1992 there was a further decline of 28 .1 % over the same period of 
1991. The rate of unemployment was 17.6% in May 1992. Retail 
prices rose by 15.1 % in June 1992 for a year-on year rise of 484%; 
recently inflation has been on an accelerating trend. The two main 
sources of monetary expansion are the central bank financing of 
the budget deficit and the refinancing of credits to the agricultural 
sector by the central bank. During the first six months of 1992 real 
wages were 53% lower than in the same period of 1991. 
Trade with other Yugoslav republics accounted for 61.3% of 
Croatia's total external trade flows in 1988. ln foreign trade, 
Croatia had trade deficits of $0. 7bn in 1989 (exports: 52.8bn, 
imports: 3.5bn) and $1.Sbn in 1990 (exports: $2.9bn, imports: 
$4.4bn). However, large surpluses in invisibles gave Croatia a 
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current account surplus of $1.0bn in 1989 and a $0.6bn deficit in 
1990. Earnings on the services account include substantial 
revenues from tourism, where Croatia accounted for about 50% 
of Yugoslavia's total official receipts of $2.7bn in 1990. Final 
foreign trade data for 1991 are not available. The National Bank 
of Croatia estimates exports of $3.1 bn ( + 7% over 1990) and 
imports of $3.Sbn ( - 20% ). There was a much-reduced positive 
balance ($88m) in invisibles, resulting in an estimated current 
account deficit of $766m. Revenues from tourism collapsed in 
1991; other invisible receipts were also in sharp decline. During the 
first half of 1992 exports were reported to be up by 24.8% and 
imports by 8.6% compared to the first half of 1991. Foreign 
exchange reserves at the central bank are extremely low ($30m in 
July 1992). 
Economic reforms were at a very early stage when civil war broke 
out. The privatization process initiated by the last Yugoslav 
government was fiercely contested by the Croatian authorities, 
partly in an effort to resist what was regarded as a policy imposed 
by the federal government but also because 'social ownership' is a 
concept with deep roots in Croatia and many of the nomenklatura 
have an interest in retaining elements of the old system. A new 
privatization law was enacted by parliament in May 1991. 
Croatia's 3,600 socially owned enterprises were given until end-
June 1992 to privatize themselves. About I ,OOO submitted 
proposals to the republic's Agency for Restructuring and 
Development. Those that did not are to be brought under state 
control, to be restructured and then privatized by some unspecified 
date. The law has been heavily criticized both at home and abroad 
because of the major role accorded to enterprise management and 
workers in the privatization process and because it excludes the 
huge agricultural 'combinats'. 
CROATIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 58.8 
Population (millions) 4.7 
Population density (per sq km) 80 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices(a) -10.2 -23.4 -25.0 
Agricultural production (b) 
Industrial production (a) - ll.3 -39.1 -28.1 
Consumer price index (a) 710.0 222.6 484.3 
Unemployment rate, in % (c) 9.2 15.4 17.6 
Budget balance, 'X, GSP(d) -4.8 
Trade balance,$ bn(c) -1.5 -0.4 0.2 
Current account, $ bn (e) -0.6 -0.8 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (c) 2.6 
Debt-export ratio, % (f) ] ]9 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) Data not availahlc. 
(c) End of period. 
(d) Consolidated state hudget deficit. accrual basis. 
(c) In convertible currencies. 
(f) Gross hard-currency deht as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Jan-Mar 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
May 
Jan-June 
Croatia is in the process of establishing an independent monetary 
system, to be achieved in two stages. The Croatian dinar, planned 
as a temporary currency, was introduced in late December 1991. It 
will be replaced by the crown when Croatia is ready to introduce 
full current account convertibility in two to three years' time. In 
the mean time the National Bank of Croatia has pegged the dinar 
to the DM, but, since it has no foreign exchange deposits to defend 
this parity, the dinar has been repeatedly devalued in recent 
months, from 55 per DM at end-December 1991 to 158 per DM in 
mid-July 1992. 
Since the outbreak of the war, the government budget has run a 
significant deficit. which it has attempted to finance by raising 
taxes, selling dinar and OM-denominated bonds, and selling state-
owned housing to the public. The real value of tax revenues was 
greatly reduced in 1991 because of the collapse in output and 
consumption. This trend is expected to continue in 1992 and, 
along with rising war-related costs, will result in a much higher 
budget deficit. 
Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia embarked on the transition to a market economy 
in late 1990/early 1991 under better macroeconomic conditions 
than other countries in transition. Thanks to a conservative fiscal 
and monetary policy over the past decade, inflation had never 
emerged as a serious problem, the monetary overhang was 
relatively small, hard-currency debt was less than 15 % of GDP, 
and net government debt was negligible. 
The country was disadvantaged, however, compared to Poland 
and Hungary, for example, with regard to the structure of the 
economy and the legal framework and basic institutions: 
concentration in industry was much higher, the private sector was 
very small, and exports were heavily biased towards East 
European countries and towards heavy industrial goods and 
am1aments. Furthermore, frictions between the different levels of 
government and the need to deal with growing tensions between 
the Czech and Slovak republics, and the Slovaks' struggle for more 
independence put additional burdens upon the reform process. 
The first steps to reform the economic and institutional structure 
were taken in 1990, when the commercial and non-commercial 
exchange rates for the koruna were unified, the koruna was 
devalued, a two-tier banking system was created, and a mixed 
system of centralized and decentralized prices was introduced. 
However, fundamental economic reforms started in earnest only 
in 1991. Cornerstones of these reforms were the complete 
liberalization of prices and external trade, large-scale privatization 
and a rigorous macroeconomic stabilization policy. About 
eighteen months later, remarkable successes in macroeconomic 
management have been achieved, with prices stable, and the 
government and external accounts close to balance. Also 
privatization seems to be well under way. Small-scale privatization 
got off to a quick start in early 199 l; and large-scale privatization, 
which started in May 1992, seems to be on track. About 30% of 
shares offered in approximately 1400 large enterprises were sold in 
the first round of a multiple-round voucher privatization scheme. 
But output has fallen sharply and structural reform is proving to 
be slow and difficult. 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Area ( !OOO sq km) 130 
Population (millions) 15.6 
Population density (per sq km) 120 
Main Economic Indicators ]990 1991 
GDP at constant prices (a) 0 -16 
Agricultural production (a) -2 -14 
Industrial production (a) -4 -21 
Consumer price index (a) 10 58 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) I 7 
Budget balance, % GDP(c) () -2 
Trade balance, $ bn ( d) -0.8 0.9 
Current account, $ bn (d) -I.I 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 8.1 9.3 
Debt-export ratio, % (c) m 91 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(h) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state hudget deficit, at.:crual hasis. 
(d) In convcrtihle currencies. 
1992 
-15 
-22 
6 
5 
0.2 
0.3 
9.1 
(e) Gross hard-currency dcht as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Q-1 
Jan-May 
June 
July 
Jan-June 
Q-l 
Q-1 
Q-1 
Czechoslovakian output has suffered a serious setback since early 
1991 as a result of several factors, not all linked to the domestic 
reform process. On the external side, the fall in exports to former 
CMEA countries reduced total demand for Czechoslovakian 
products, while the switch of CMEA trade to a convertible 
currency base implied a significant deterioration in the terms of 
trade. On the internal side, the pace of the reallocation of resources 
(rapid decline in output in existing branches and a slow and 
hesitant start in building new structures), as a result of the move to 
a market system and the change in relative prices, contributed to a 
negative output shock. Also, restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
in response to the (unexpectedly high) price surge in early 1991 
contributed to the overall contraction of supply. Finally, domestic 
demand, especially investment expenditures, was driven down by 
substantial uncertainty concerning future institutional develop-
ments, the structure of relative prices and the consequences of 
privatization. 
All in all, real GDP declined by 16% in 1991, and both in the 
Czech republic and in Slovakia the decline in industrial production 
reached more than 20%, and output in construction shrank by 
about one third. According to official statistics, public consump-
tion stagnated, but personal consumption fell by one third, and net 
investment even became negative from the third quarter. 
In mid-1992, some indications are emerging that the economic 
decline is about to taper off, with production in traditional sectors 
stabilizing and output and employment growth in new sectors 
gaining momentum. Inflation seems now to be under control, 
public finances show no alarming developments, interest rates 
have come down somewhat, and the exchange rate remains stable. 
Furthermore, the trade balance is in surplus and the gross hard-
currency debt is no longer rising. 
The redirection of trade away from the former CMEA bloc has 
continued, and these countries now account for less than one fifth 
of total CSFR exports. The authorities intend to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate for the koruna, so as to hold domestic prices and 
wages within reasonable bounds. The Czechoslovak government 
is likely to allow full repatriation of both local and hard-currency 
profits before the koruna becomes fully convertible. 
However, major structural adjustment is still to come, and will 
probably have significant negative repercussions on the labour 
market and on enterprises' balance sheets. Although registered 
unemployment rates edged down in early 1992 (partly as a result of 
changed registration methods), large-scale labour-shedding seems 
unavoidable to improve the competitiveness and profitability of 
enterprises, as the alternative (a further significant decline in real 
wages) is politically less feasible. Major risks are also hidden in the 
enterprises' accounts, as liabilities are accumulating and debt 
servicing may endanger the necessary modernization of the capital 
stock. This may lead to significant pressure to bail out the 
enterprise sector. 
The economic success story of Czechoslovakian reforms, which 
has resulted from favourable macroeconomic starting conditions, 
comprehensive and rapid economic policy reform and good 
macroeconomic demand management is, however, increasingly 
overshadowed by political developments. Since 1990, growing 
tensions between the Czech republic and Slovakia have already 
slowed down the reform process. Since early 1992 reform-related 
legislation has come to a standstill and is unlikely to resume before 
the future of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is settled. 
Hungary 
1992 is a test year for the Hungarian economy, which is now 
operating under the nearly completed legal and institutional 
market framework. However, with the breakdown of the CMEA 
II 
trading system, the transition to a market economy has been more 
painful than expected and one of the challenges for economic 
policy in 1992 is to resume positive growth. 
After declining by 10.2% in 1991, GDP is not expected to grow in 
1992: projections for the growth rate lie between - 3 and 0%. The 
uncertainties surrounding the 1992 outcome relate to the 
possibility that export growth will level off; the likelihood that 
private consumption will fall by more than expected, which is 
indicated by the increasing propensity of households to save; and, 
on the positive side, an upsurge in investment. 
Industrial production is not recovering: it fell by 18. 9% in the first 
4 months of 1992, compared to 19 .1 % in 1991. Large companies, 
which were more dependent on exports to the Soviet Union, are 
primarily affected. The official statistics, which do not fully take 
into account the expanding private sector, overestimate the 
recession. In 1991, industrial companies employing less than 50 
employees, the category where the private sector is concentrated, 
increased their production by 50.1 %, compared to a fall of21.5% 
for companies with more than 50 employees. In 1992, the 
contribution of the private sector to GDP is expected to increase 
from 25 to 33%. 
HUNGARY 
Area (1000 sq km) 93.6 
Population (millions) 10.3 
Population density (per sq km) 110 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices (a) -5.0 -10.2 
Agricultural production (a) -4.0 -3.0 
Industrial production (a) -10.5 -19.1 -18.9 
Consumer price index (a) 28.9 35.0 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 1.7 8.5 
Budget balance, 'X, GDP (c) -0.8 -4.6 
Trade balance,$ bn(d) 0.3 0.2 
Current account, 5 bn ( d) 0.1 0.3 
Gross foreign debt,$ bn(b) 21.3 22.7 
Debt-export ratio. 01., (e) 46 29 
(a) Percentage increa~e over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated ~tale budget deficit_ accrual ha~is. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
19.6 
10.1 
0.6 
0.5 
21.6 
(c) Gross hard-currency deht a~ a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Jan-Apr 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-May 
Jan-Apr 
Apr 
The number of registered unemployed reached 547,000 by the end 
of June 1992, corresponding to l 0.1 % of the workforce. The 
Ministry of Labour has predicted that unemployment might 
approach 12 % by the end of 1992. Real per capita income shrank 
by 9.8% in 1991, and by 3.6% if transfers and interest payments 
are included. In 1992, a further deterioration of households' 
income is not foreseen, since real wages have fallen only slightly so 
far. Hungarians have responded to the deterioration in their living 
conditions by increasing savings: the savings ratio increased from 
6.8°/i, in 1990 to 14% in 1991. Partial data for 1992 indicate that 
this trend is continuing. The fall in private consumption is now 
becoming the main driving factor in the recession. 
Since January 1991, when consumer prices increased by 7.5%, 
monthly price increases have overall decelerated resulting in an 
inflation rate of 35% in 1991. Inflation is further slowing down in 
1992, with a projected annual rate of 20 to 25 % . Since April 1992, 
monthly price increases have not exceeded 1.5%, so that for the 
first six months of 1992 consumer prices have increased by 19.6% 
compared to the same period last year. With the completion of 
price liberalization, prices are now influenced by changes in taxes, 
profit margins and the import content. Industrial producer prices 
are rising at about half the rate of consumer prices. 
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For the second consecutive year, the recession is undermining the 
fiscal stabilization undertaken by the Hungarian government. In 
1991, the deficit target was overshot by one percentage point of 
GDP. In June 1992, the fiscal deficit amounted to Ftl08bn, 
exceeding its annual target of Ft70bn. The target had thus to be 
revised and has now been set at Ftl60-180bn, corresponding to 
about 4% of GDP. All components on the fiscal revenue side are 
recording losses, reflecting the fall in households' income and the 
increasing difficulties of Hungarian companies. Overall, in June 
1992, revenues were 12% lower than expected. Spending on the 
other hand, was kept within the budgetary limits. 
The positive external performance is one of the unexpected 
features of the Hungarian transition. In 1991, the current account 
in convertible currency recorded a surplus of $26 7 million, a result 
in sharp contrast with the original forecast of a deficit of$ I .2bn. In 
1992, in view of a trade surplus of $590 million at the end of May, 
it is now believed that the trade and current accounts will again 
end up with a surplus, although a trade deficit between $300 and 
$500 million was originally projected. However, this good result 
has been achieved at lower levels of exports and imports than last 
year. This trend is not confirmed by customs data which are 
increasingly diverging from balance of payments data: the 
customs data show a smaller surplus for the first six months, of 
about $113 million for transactions involving cash, with exports 
growing by 16.5% and imports 6% lower than last year. Hungary 
is progressing further in reorienting its trade towards the EC, 
which in mid-1992 represented 49.4'Yo of Hungarian exports. In 
1992, trade with the ex-CM EA partners is recovering: in the first 
half of the year, Hungarian exports to the zone increased by 23% 
and imports by 34%. 
International reserves in foreign currencies expanded from $1.1 hn 
at end-1990 to $5.1 hn at the end of May 1992, having increased by 
$ I bn over the first five months of 1992. They now cover about 6 
months' imports. Gross external debt in convertible currencies is 
stabilizing, reaching $22.2bn at the end of May 1992, compared to 
$22.7hn at the end of last year. Foreign direct investment, which 
reached $ I .45bn in l 991, well above the expected $550111, is 
progressing at the same rate in 1992: by the end of April, $660 
million had come in to the country. 
The Forint has been devalued twice in 1992, in March by 1.9°!., 
against the dollar-ECU basket and in June hy l .6%. These 
devaluations make up for about two thirds of the inflation gap 
between Hungary and its main trading partners. But given the 
good balance of payments perfonnance, the Hungarian govern-
ment thinks that the economy can cope with an appreciation of the 
Forint. On I July l 992, an inter-bank market was set up and the 
foreign exchange regulations were further liberalized. To begin 
with, the central bank will intervene on the market to limit 
fluctuations of the forint vis-c't-vis the main currencies to, initially, 
0.25%. 
In 1992, the changes affecting the company sector are accelerating. 
In 1991, 11 % of state assets were sold, yielding total income close 
to Ft40bn, of which 85% was hard currency cash. In 1992, in the 
first five months alone, privatization income amounted to Ft35bn, 
with a lower foreign participation. However, up to now, the strong 
growth of the private sector has been due less to the privatization 
of state-owned companies than to the rapid expansion of new 
enterprises, aided by sizeable infusions of foreign capital. The main 
uncertainty in the recent developments is the impact of bankruptcy 
and liquidation on the economy: following the application of the 
new 1991 legislation, 381 companies arc being examined for 
bankruptcy, and liquidation proceedings have been started for 440 
companies. The government is trying to mitigate the deterioration 
of the business climate through various measures: new legislation 
on state contracts has been adopted which gives priority to 
Hungarian firms; debt relief financed out of last year's 
privatization proceeds is being offered to key companies. A step 
has also been taken on the financial side to reduce the cost of 
borrowing with a decrease of interest rates by 2%, but the weak 
financial situation of companies still restricts their ability to 
borrow. Consequently, commercial banks will continue to finance 
the public deficit and to hold excess liquidity. 
The progranune of structural reform proceeds. Key legislative acts 
were passed in 1991: the central bank act. the banking law, the 
investment funds act, the compensation law, the employment act. 
These were followed by the company tax law and the act on the 
social security fund in 1992. Draft hills on public finance and the 
tax system are being prepared. 
Poland 
The declining trends which were strongly evident in the Polish 
economy during 1989 were exacerbated hy the radical stabilization 
measures introduced on I January 1990. The stabilization 
programme provided for: price liberalization and an end to most 
subsidies: a devaluation of the zloty and the introduction of 
convertibility for current transactions; strict control of wage rises 
above stipulated levels; a reduction in the state budget deficit to I 
per cent of GDP. 
The stabilization programme helped to reduce hyper-inflation 
from 640% in 1989 to 249°/o in 1990 and 60.4 % in 1991. During 
the second half of 1991 inflation had stabilized at a monthly rate of 
2-3%. In the first six months of 1992 prices increased by 22.3%, 
the June figure representing a 39.0% increase on the same month a 
year ago. The recent slowing of inflation prompted the National 
Bank to lower the key interest rate from 40% to 38% in June 1992. 
Stabilization has resulted in significantly lower levels of economic 
activity for two years, hut there are signs now that the recession is 
ending. GDP declined hy 12% in 1990 and is reported by the 
statistical office to have declined by 7°/o in 1991. The rapid 
expansion of the small private sector, which grew hy about 25% in 
1991, could only partially compensate for the slump in the 
economy's state sector. Industrial production in 1991 was 14.2% 
lower than in 1990 and 35'Y., lower than in 1989. Gross agricultural 
production in 1990 increased by 2.5% over 1989 but fell by 2% in 
1991. Output continued to decline in the first two months of 1992, 
but has since shown some recovery. Unemployment rose from 
negligible levels at the start of 1990 to 2.3 million in June 1992 
(12.6% of the workforce). Moreover, substantial variations in 
unemployment have emerged, with the rate ranging from just over 
5% in Warsaw to over 20% in some northern regions. 
The pronounced decline in economic activity resulted in a large 
deficit for the state budget in 1991 ($2.7bn or 3.5% of GDP, 
compared to the $0.4bn deficit originally approved for the full 
year). This was mostly due to the poor financial condition of many 
state enterprises, which resulted in their tax liabilities exceeding 
their profits on aggregate hy 22%. Consequently industry owed 
over $2hn to the state coftcrs in unpaid taxes. 
The 1992 budget envisages a deficit of 65.5 trillion zloty ($4.8hn). 
This package keeps the deficit within the limit agreed with the 
IMF, of 5% of GDP, and includes plans to introduce charges for 
some health services, to limit public sector wage and pension rises 
and gradually to remove subsidies on transport and energy prices. 
Although parliament approved the budget, the Constitutional 
Court has recently ruled against cuts in public sector pay and 
pensions. This entails an additional outlay of 28, I OObn zloty, but 
the government still hopes to stay within the IMF's limit by 
delaying the expenditure until 1993. 
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POLAND 
Area (1000 sq km) 318.3 
Population (millions) 38.2 
Population density (per sq km) 120 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 
GDP at constant prices (a) -11.6 -7.0 
Agricultural production (a) -2.2 -2.0 
Industrial production (a) -24.2 -12.9 
Consumer price index (a) 249.3 60.3 
Unemployment rate, in% (b) 6.3 11.8 
Budget balance,% GDP(c) 0.4 -3.4 
Trade balance,$ bn(d) 2.2 0.1 
Current account, $ bn (d) 0.7 -1.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 46.6 46.9 
Debt-export ratio, % (c) 430 370 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
1992 
7.6 
39.0 
12.6 
0.9 
0.3 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
June 
June 
June 
June 
June 
Both tax revenues and government expenditures were below target 
for the first half of the year, the net result being a deficit of 25.7 
trillion zloty. Although the deficit is below the target for the first 
half of the year, the prospects of meeting the target for the full year 
are less likely. Recently approved state sector wage rises and delays 
in the reduction of subsidies on some household items are expected 
to result in rapid growth in expenditures in the second half of the 
year, and there is little prospect of significant increases in tax 
revenues over the coming months. However, the new govern-
ment's ability to respond quickly to budget problems, should they 
emerge, will have been enhanced by the recent parliamentary 
approval of the 'small constitution'. This clarifies the role of the 
Presidency, and allows the government to act more independently 
of the parliament. 
Trade results were markedly worse in 1991 as a result of higher 
energy prices, the shift to hard currency settlement of trade with 
other East European countries, the real appreciation of the zloty, 
the loss of markets in the former East Germany and the collapse of 
exports to the USSR. Exports in convertible currencies reached 
$12.8bnin 1991 (up 17.5% on 1990)whileimportsroseto$12.7bn 
(up 47% ), resulting in a small trade surplus of $5 lm compared to a 
surplus of $2.2bn in 1990. Reserves declined by $ l.2bn in 1991. 
This trend has been reversed in the first half of 1992, with exports 
increasing by 12.5%, and imports falling by 8% over the same 
period of 1991. This led to a trade surplus of $946m for the period. 
For the first 16 months of the stabilization programme the 
government maintained a stable exchange rate. However, the need 
to improve competitiveness and offset the effects of domestic 
inflation led to a 14.4% devaluation in May 1991. Higher customs 
tariffs on most imports were introduced in August 1991 to 
improve further the terms of trade, and in October 1991 a 
'crawling peg' policy was adopted, which entails a 1.8% 
devaluation of the zloty each month against a basket of five 
Western currencies. In addition, a 12% devaluation of the zloty, 
against the same basket, was announced on 25 February 1992. 
Poland had been unable since 1981 to service fully its external debt, 
which in February 1991 stood at around $48.Sbn, of which about 
$32bn was owed to 17 of the Paris Club of government creditors. 
In March 1991 Poland reached an agreement with the Paris Club, 
which envisages a reduction of the net present value of the debt by 
fifty per cent. As of the end of April, some 13 bilateral 
arrangements had been reached with western creditors. The 
agreement is formally dependent on successful implementation of 
an !MF-approved three-year economic programme. Poland failed 
to meet the IMF performance criteria relating to its budget deficit, 
inflation rate and foreign reserve level for June 1991. From 
September 1991 onwards, all remaining IMF credits to Poland 
were suspended. Negotiations are under way to revise the 
performance criteria for 1992, with a view to resuming lending. 
However, further progress in reaching an agreement hinges on the 
implementation of the budget. The Polish government has also 
been carrying out negotiations on the $10.6bn owed to commercial 
banks, plus $1.Sbn of overdue interest. Talks are due to resume as 
soon as a new IMF agreement is in place. 
Popular support for the stabilization programme has weakened 
because of the protracted recession and the sharp decline in real 
wages. Profound structural adjustments still need to be im-
plemented, including large-scale privatization and legislation 
which will complete the institutional framework of a free market 
economy. A large number of small and medium-sized enterprises 
have already been privatized through a system of direct sales by 
auction, but the privatization programme for large enterprises has 
progressed at a slow pace. The government aims to transfer to the 
private sector about half of Poland's 8,000 large enterprises during 
the next two years. 
The privatization process is complicated by the absence of a sound 
commercial banking system. A two-tier banking system has been 
created, and the liberal licensing policy has resulted in the creation 
of about sixty new private banks, half of which are privately 
owned while the rest belong to state enterprises. A number of small 
co-operative banks have also been established or revamped; these 
are particularly active in rural areas. However, the commercial 
banks have been beset with problems of bad loans, exacerbated by 
the recession. Some steps have been taken towards financial 
liberalization. The National Bank of Poland has built up the 
domestic money market and has introduced new credit instru-
ments. The government is in the process of preparing a 
comprehensive body of general bank legislation in line with EC 
directives. 
A thorough reform of the country's public finances is under way. 
The tax system is being overhauled, with the aim of increasing tax 
revenues from the rapidly expanding private sector in order to 
make up for falling revenues from unprofitable state enterprises. 
Personal income tax was introduced from l January 1992 and 
applies to all physical persons except farmers. There are three 
rates, the highest being 50%. Value added tax is now scheduled to 
be introduced in 1993. However, the government is experiencing 
difficulties in improving tax administration. 
Romania 
The conditions under which Romania embarked on economic 
reform were particularly difficult. The country had no net foreign 
debt, but this was achieved at a substantial human and economic 
cost. During the last years of the Ceaucescu regime imports were 
kept very low; for a decade virtually no western machinery was 
imported. Exports (most notably of agricultural goods) were 
stimulated, but they were made possible by repressed consumption 
at home. A deliberate policy was followed of holding down 
services and high technology in favour of heavy industry and 
manual labour. Moreover, significant resources were squandered 
on prestige projects. As a result, Romania's industrial infrastruc-
ture is among the most backward in Europe, and its workforce is 
particularly demoralized and badly trained. 
Most economic indicators worsened significantly in 1991 and early 
1992. Real GDP is estimated by the National Bank of Romania to 
have declined last year by 13%. Industrial production during the 
first five months of 1992 was 17 .6% lower than in the same period 
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of 1991, but agricultural production remained stable. Consumer 
prices were 222% higher in January-May 1992 compared to a year 
earlier, following price and currency liberalization. Average real 
incomes have fallen by more than 30% since 1989. Unemployment 
was 5.4% in May 1992. 
After the revolution the government halted food exports and 
sharply raised imports to improve domestic supply. This, together 
with the disintegration of the CMEA and the fall in domestic 
production, led to a deficit of $1.7bn in the hard currency trade 
account in 1990. Since the invisibles account was in balance, the 
current account also showed a deficit of $1.7bn. A similar pattern 
emerged in 1991, with a deficit of$ I .4bn on both the trade and the 
current account. During the first six months of 1992, trade 
liberalization pushed exports sharply higher to $1.9bn ( + 28.5% 
over the same period in 1991 ), while imports fell slightly to $2.6bn 
(-4%). In the same period rouble trade has collapsed, with 
exports dropping from 662m roubles in 1991 to 53m in 1992 and 
imports from 476m roubles in 1991 to I20m in I 992. Foreign debt 
is low at $3.2bn, or $141 per capita. 
ROMANIA 
Area (] OOO sq km) 232 
Population (millions) 23.2 
Population density (per sq km) 100 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices(a) -7.4 - 13.0 
Agricultural production (a) -3.0 -5.0 
Industrial production (a) -17.4 -18.7 -17.6 
Consumer price index (a) 344.5(1) 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 2.9 
Budget balance, 'Yo GDP (c) I.I 2.l 
Trade balance, $ bn ( d) -1.7 -1.4 
Current account. $ bn (d) -1.7 -1.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 0.3 l.9 
Debt-export ratio, % (e) 8 54 
(a) Percentage increase over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(h) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
222.0 
5.4 
-0.7 
3.2 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
(f) Dec. 1991 compared v..ith Oct. 1990, \\.hen the new CPI was introduced. 
latest 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
May 
Jan-June 
Economic reform in 1990 and most of 1991 moved at a slower 
pace than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Roman's 
government initially hesitated to take painful measures. Later the 
government obtained parliamentary authorization to implement 
much more radical economic reform by decree, but the 
programme was flawed both in its conception and in its 
presentation to the public. In September 1991, renewed civil unrest 
led to the resignation of the government. The new government of 
Prime Minister Stolojan carried out the previous government's 
plan to make the currency convertible, and took the highly 
unpopular measure to raise energy prices, aligning them with 
international levels. Presidential and legislative elections are due to 
be held at the end of September 1992. 
Price liberalization started in November 1990, but major controls 
remained, as well as exemptions for basic goods, rents, etc.; the 
announcement of further increases in January 1991 led to 
vociferous public protests and to delays; under IMF pressure 
further rounds of increases were implemented in April, July and 
November. Well over 80% of prices are now free, but the staged 
approach and the associated announcement effects have led to 
unnecessarily high inflation. Subsidies on staple foods and 
electricity were cut by 25'Yo in early May 1992, leading to sharp 
price rises. A further 25% reduction is scheduled for September 
1992, and the government plans to eliminate all subsidies by the 
end of 1993. The government also raised minimum monthly wages 
and announced a series of pay rises and cash handouts, which were 
meant to compensate for about half the new price rises. However, 
some enterprises have circumvented wage guidelines and granted 
nominal wage rises equal to the rate of inflation. 
A series of very sharp devaluations were carried out between 
November 1990 and November 1991, at which point current 
account convertibility for residents was introduced, in a dual 
foreign exchange market. On the one hand, the central bank 
operates a managed float in a daily inter-bank market, although it 
is constrained by limited foreign exchange reserves ($0.3bn in 
April 1992). On the other hand, individuals have access to foreign 
exchange through exchange offices; the exchange rate here is not 
managed. Although all export proceeds must be repatriated 
immediately, Romanian legal persons may hold hard currency 
accounts, and exporting firms are allowed to keep all their hard 
currency revenues. 
Budgetary policy has been restrictive. In 1991 the budget deficit 
was higher than originally forecast, at slightly above 2% of GDP. 
This was due to shortfalls in revenue; spending was well under 
control. The 1992 budget projects a deficit of Lei 89bn (less than 
2% of GDP). Monetary policy, on the other hand, suffered severe 
setbacks in 1991 ; money growth targets were exceeded by a 
sizeable margin, in part because of a decision by the Parliament 
that the central bank should inject liquidity into the debt-ridden 
enterprise sector. This has contributed to fuelling inflation. 
Recently the government embarked on a new economic strategy, 
designed with the assistance of the IMF, with the aim of stabilizing 
the economy. The new strategy is intended to halt the decline in 
production, limit annual inflation to 40°/c, by the end of 1992, 
contain the 1992 budget deficit to 2'Yo of GDP, build up reserves to 
$500m by the end of the year (roughly equivalent to one month's 
imports) and limit the current account deficit to $ l.3bn in 1992. 
These targets arc to be achieved by implementing tight fiscal 
policies, introducing positive real interest rates -- the central bank 
has raised interest rates from 28 to 80 per cent -, establishing 
ceilings on the growth of money supply and domestic credit (89% 
and 69% respectively) and introducing a flexible exchange rate 
policy. 
After a slow start the implementation of structural reform 
measures has been accelerated. In April 1991, Parliament adopted 
a fairly liberal framework law on foreign direct investment. It 
allows wholly foreign-owned companies to be set up in all sectors 
of the economy, and grants significant tax and import duty relief 
to investors; all profits may be repatriated in hard currency after 
the payment of a I 0% tax. Foreign investments are granted full 
protection by the constitution. 
Privatization of small plots of fam1land is nearly complete, with 
82% of land in private ownership at present. Also, by mid-1991 
some 50% of the housing stock and, by early 1992, a third of retail 
trade had been privatized. Large privatization is just getting under 
way. According to a July 1991 law, about 6,200 firms, or 55% of 
state sector equity, will be privatized; a 30% share in these firms is 
being distributed to the population through a system of free 
vouchers, and the rest will be held by the state and will be gradually 
privatized over the next seven years. There arc plans to set up a 
stock market by the end of 1992. 
The government has already made several adjustments to the tax 
system over the past two years, mainly to broaden its base and 
streamline its operation. It plans a comprehensive modernization 
of the system, including the introduction of VAT in 1993 and 
personal income tax in 1994. 
Slovenia 
Slovenia, with a population of 1.9 million, was Yugoslavia's most 
developed republic. Its GDP was 18.2% of Yugoslavias in 1989, 
and GDP per capita was 121 % above the Yugoslav average. 
Industry accounted for 46% of GDP, while agriculture accounted 
for only 6%. Slovenia's economy was the most export-oriented of 
the Yugoslav federation; exports accounted for 30% of the 
republic's GDP in 1990. 
Slovenia was also Yugoslavia's most industrialized republic. The 
most important branches of industry are electrical machinery, 
metalworking, textiles and machine building. However, much of 
Slovenia's basic industry is in urgent need of modernization and 
restructuring, and the country's infrastructure, including most 
transport and telecommunications, is largely obsolete. On the 
other hand, Slovenia has the advantage of a comparatively high-
quality work force. 
Slovenia's output has been declining in recent years, having fallen 
by 2.9% in 1988, 0.5% in 1989 and 8.3% in 1990, the sharp fall of 
1990 being mostly due to the deep recession which occurred in 
Yugoslavia as a result of the stabilization programme. Even 
though Slovenia was spared the heavy damage inflicted on other 
parts of the country by the civil war, the resulting economic 
dislocation accentuated already existing supply problems arising 
from production bottlenecks and lack of foreign exchange, and 
caused a fall in output in 1991 estimated at 12%. Industrial 
production, having stagnated throughout the late 1980s, fell by 
about 12.4% in 1991 and by l 6'Yo during the first halfof 1992 over 
the first half of 1991. Retail prices during the first seven months of 
1992 were 277% higher than in the same period of 1991, although 
the monthly rate declined from 25% in October 1991 to 2°!., in July 
1992. The Bank of Slovenia has raised interest rates to 25% per 
month and hopes to reduce inflation drastically by the end of 1992. 
Slovenia had traditionally been a full-employment society, but in 
early 1991 the number of registered unemployed began rising 
sharply, and reached 10.8% of the labour force in May 1992. 
The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation has created some 
problems for Slovenia's economy. Trade with other ex-Yugoslav 
republics, which formerly accounted for about 60% of the 
country's total trade, has fallen to 15'Yo in recent months. Thus 
Slovenian exporters have been forced to seek new markets abroad. 
In foreign trade, following a surplus of $0.2bn in 1989, Slovenia 
recorded a $0.6bn deficit in 1990 (exports: $4.1 bn, imports: 
$4. 7bn), which was mostly due to higher imports brought about by 
the over-valued dinar and extensive trade liberalization. The 
turbulent situation which prevailed in 1991 brought about a 
contraction of trading activity, with exports of $3.9bn (-6.4% 
compared to 1990) and imports of$4.lbn (-12.3%). The steeper 
relative decline of imports resulted in the shrinking of the trade 
deficit to $0.3bn. The invisibles balance sulTered in 1991, because 
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of the drop in receipts from tourism and emigrants' remittances; 
there was a $0.2bn current account surplus for the year compared 
to $0. 7bn in 1990. During the first half of 1992 exports rose by 2% 
and imports fell by 20% over the same period in 1991. Slovenia's 
share of Yugoslavia's foreign debt is estimated at approximately 
$1.Sbn, or 43% of the value of the country's exports in 1991. 
Slovenia was the most reform-minded republic of Yugoslavia; 
since independence the parliament has adopted legislation which 
has liberalized foreign exchange operations, deregulated the 
banking sector and liberalized prices. However, much remains to 
be done. The government has also promoted the rapid 
privatization of many state-owned enterprises, but its ambitious 
plans in this area have been delayed by the civil war and by internal 
disagreement on the best way to proceed. A series of bills has now 
been presented to Parliament but none has been adopted to date. 
SLOVENIA 
Area (1000 sq km) 20 
Population (millions) 2.0 
Population density (per sq km) 100 
Main Economic Indicators 1990 1991 1992 
GDP at constant prices (a) -8.3 -12.7 
Agricultural production (a) -2.8 1.5 
Industrial production (a) -10.5 -12.4 -16.0 
Consumer price index (a) 550.0 118.0 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 6.9 10.l 
Budget balance, 01., GDP(c) 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) -0.6 -0.3 
Current account, $ bn (d) 0.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 1.8 
Debt-export ratio, % (e) 46 
(a) Percentage increase over (lhc same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Data not available. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
277.0 
10.8 
-0.3 
0.4 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
latest 
Jan-June 
Jan-July 
May 
Jan-June 
Jan-Apr 
Slovenia introduced its own currency, the tollar, in October 1991. 
For a brief period dinars could be exchanged for the new currency 
at a one-to-one rate. Since then the tollar has been allowed to float, 
its rate freely determined by the foreign exchange market. There is 
full convertibility for current account transactions while there still 
remain some exchange controls on capital account transactions. 
Foreign currency reserves have more than quadrupled to reach 
$980m in July 1992. There is no organized market for cross-border 
tollar-dinar transactions. 
Slovenia has completely restructured its fiscal system. The 
multitude of taxes and contributions which previously existed were 
abolished and a progressive income tax system was introduced, 
consisting of four rates ranging from 19-46%. A corporate tax 
system was put in place, with a uniform 30% rate applied on 
corporate profits for 1992. A turnover tax came into effect on 
I February 1992 with rates of 5-32% on all goods and services; a 
value-added tax is scheduled to be introduced in 1994. 
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Principal economic policy measures - July/August 1992 
Community (EUR-12) 
3.7 Social Dialogue Summit adopts texts on both the future development of the 
dialogue and on the new cooperation strategy for growth and employment. 
13. 7 Ecofin Council: The Council carried out the multilateral surveillance 
exercise envisaged under the convergence decision of March 1990. 
/3.7 Ecofin Council: The convergence programme presented by the 
Netherlands was given a strong endorsement by the Council. 
Belgium (B) 
/6.7 The central bank increases its seven-day loan rate by 0.15 ofa percentage 
point to 9.45%. This rise is in line with similar decisions taken by the Bundesbank 
and the Nedcrlandsche Bank. 
3.8 The government presents the draft budget for 1993. The 1993 budget is an 
element of the multiannual fiscal adJustmcnt programme for the years 1993-
1996 which lists the measures to be taken to meet the objectives set in the 
conv~rgence plan (released in June). The draft budget involves a savings package 
of about BFR 130 billion (1.7% of GNP): BFR 117 b1lhon for the natt0nal 
government budget and BFR 13 billion for the social security budget.. The 
government estimates that, 1f. other levels of general government (regions, 
communities and local authont1es) meet the objectives set for them. 111 the 
convergence programme, this would cut the general government deficit from 
5.7% of GNP in 1992 to 5.2% in 1993. 
Denmark (DK) 
None. 
Germany (D) 
/6.7 The Bundesbank raises its discount rate to 8.75% (from 8.0%), with effect 
from 17 July. 
Greece (GR) 
/.7 By decision of the Bank of Greece, the compulsory in".cstm_ent by 
commercial banks in Treasury bills is reduced from 25'Yo to 20% of the mcrease 
in their deposits. In addition, compulsory funds reserved for the financmg of 
handicraft arc reduced from 8% to 7%. 
7.8 The government announces a package of tax increases aimed at conta_in_ing 
the budget deficit. The revenue impact has been estimated at DR 138 b1ll1011 
(0.9'Y., of GDP) for the remainder of 1992 and DR 465 b1lhon (2.8% of GDP) for_ 
1993. The package includes an 111crease 111_the tax on fuels (the retail pnce of 
gasoline going up from DR 145 to I 95_per htre _( + 34%)) and_ that of diesel from 
DR 100 to 130 per litre ( + 30%), an 111crcase 111 the tax on 111terest mcome on 
bank deposits from I 0% to_ 15%, and an 111cre~se 111 the tax on cars (effective 
from 1.1.1993); at the same time, the highest VA 1 rate of 36% on electromcs and 
luxury goods is abolished ,md the excise duty on tobacco products 1s raised pan 
passu to offset the revenue losses. 
Spain (E) 
21.7 The government approves a package of budgetary measures designed to 
help correct the undesirable fiscal developments that may undermme efforts to 
achieve the objective of the con_vergenee programme. These measures mclude a 
rise in revenue of PT A 130 b1ll1011 and a reduction 111 current and capital 
expenditure of PT A 195 billion. 
23. 7 As part of its regular intervention, the Bank of Spain increases the money 
market rate from 12.4°1,, to 13%. 
30.7 The Treasury increases by 0.56 of a percentage point the interest rate on 
twelveonth securities, bringing it to 12.72%. 
27.8 Further increase of 0.25 of a percentage point in the interest rate on one-
year government securities, bringing it to 12.97%. 
France (F) 
2.7 Parliament passes legislation concerning apprenticeships. 
18.7 Unemployment insurnnce contributionsare increased by 0.8%,_ with effect 
from I August. The cond1t1ons tor benefic1anes become more rcstnct1ve. 
20.7 A four-year plan is adopted in favour of farmers, with effect from 
I July 1993. 
1.8 The financial support for firms putting employees on short-tune working 
rather than making them redundant 1s renewed till the end of this year. 
5.8 In order to increase part-time jobs, the corresponding social sec1;1rity 
contributions paid by employers arc reduced by 30%, with effect from 
I September. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
31.7 The government, the trade unions and the industrial _employers· 
association sign a joint document (Protocol on Incomes Pohcy, the Fight agamst 
In nation and Labour Costs). The main points arc the followmg: 
the indexation clause (known as ·scale mobile'), the latest form of which had 
expired at the end of 1991, has definitively ceased to exist. For the period 
1992-1993, a separate payment of LIT20000 (ECU 13.3) per month has 
been agreed upon, to be effected starting from January 1993 and to be 
incorporated subsequently into the nonnal wage. For the same penod,_ the 
parties will refrain from firn1-level agreements or umlateral concessions 
resulting in wage increases; . . 
further negotiations on the reshaping of the wage-bargammg framework. 
expected to be concluded by mid-septembcr, will take place; . 
the govcrmncnt signals its commitment to a course of action aimed at: 
regulating administered prices, and particularly public fees and charges, 
in a way consistent with the achievement of the stated 111tlat1on targets 
(3,5% in 1993, 2,5% in 1994, 2% in 1995); . , . 
avoiding further tax increases by focusing on the reduction of tax evasion 
and tax expenditure; 
pursuing an active labour policy_ also by speedily implementing the 
provisions of the reform enacted 111 July 1991. 
Luxembourg (L) 
/6.7 Parliament approves the bill reforming health insurance funds and the 
public health system. The bill provides in particular for: . 
the restructuring of the Union of Health Insurance Funds (the funds will be 
given greater independence, particularly in drawing up the budget and m 
setting contributions and the proportion to be paid by those msured)_; 
a central government contribution to the future financmg of add1t10nal 
payments; 
central government to be responsible for the deficit accumulated up to the 
end of 1992 (LFR 700 million) and for that to be mcurrcd under the 1993 
budget (LFR 300 million); . 
an increase in the contributions of those insured from 4. 7% to 5%, with effect 
from I August 1992. 
3.8 The government outlines its drati 19_93 budget. It anticipates a rate of GDP 
growth, in volume terms, of 3.5% and an 111tlat1on rate of 3.6%. Gross revenue 1s 
forecast to total LFR 124.6 billion, i.e. an increase of 5.5% compared with the 
1992 budget. Gross expenditure is expected to amount to LFR I ~6.2 billion, i.e. a 
rise of 6.4% compared with the 1992 budget. There will therefore be a budget 
deficit of LFR 1.6 billion. In order lo cover that deficit, the central government 
will have to borrow approximately LFR 3.5 billion per year between 1993 and 
1995. According to the draft 1993 budget, public investment (mamly earmarked 
for road infrastructure) will rise by almost 11 %. In 1993 the Grand Duchy"s 
budget deficit will be less than I% of GDP, while its debt will not exceed 2.9% of 
GDP. 
Netherlands (NL) 
/6.7 The Nederlandsche Bank increases its special loan rate by 0.2 of a 
percentage point to 9.5%. This rise is in line with similar decisions taken by the 
Bundesbank and the Banque Nationale de Belgique. 
3 I .7 The Nederlandsche Bank increases its special loan rate by 0.1 of a 
percentage point to 9.6°/ii. This decision was taken in response to some weakness 
in the guilder vis-,l-vis the German mark. 
Portugal (P) 
I 3.8 The Bank or Portugal announces the gradual phasing-out of restrictions 
on capital inflows by the end of the year and a reduction in interest rates. The end 
of the requirement to lodge a non-111terest-bcanng deposit with the central bank 
of 25% of the amount of any borrowings abroad is set for 31 August, while the 
abolition of the ban on non-residents purchasing lloating-rate bonds is scheduled 
for 31 October. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
22.7 Government cuts interest rates on savings instruments from 10.34% to 
9.67% to try to forestall mortgage-rate increases induced by competition for 
funds. 
]2.7 Govcrmnent announces major restructuring of public expenditure 
planning and control aggregates effective from the 1994-95 financial year. 
22.7 Government reconfim1s the UKL 244.5 billion 'planning total' for 
expenditure in the 1993-94 finuncial year despite cyclical (and departmental) 
pressures to relax it. 
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